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I. INTRODUCTION
IoT [1] is a large network whichconsists of various information sensing devices and the Internet. RFID, as an automatic identification and data capture technology, is one of the core technologies of IoT and is listed as one of the ten most significant technologies in the 21st century [2] .
Compared with the traditional two-dimensional codes, bar codes, magnetic cards and IC cards, RFID has many advantages such as having no contact with other something, remote reading, long life and easy operation, etc.
With the extensiveuse of RFID technology, many security and privacy issues frequently appear.To solve this problem, scholars have proposed many different RFID security authentication schemes such as Hash-lock protocol [3] , random Hash-lock protocol [4] , Hash-chain protocol [5] , the change of ID protocol based on hash algorithm [6] , David's digital library protocol [7] , distributed challenge-response authentication protocol [8] and LD authentication protocol [9] , etc. However, neither do these schemes achieve a high level of security to resist a variety of attacks, nor do these protocols take into account the efficiency. More mature encryption algorithms and authentication mechanisms are not well applied directly to RFID system because of the limitation of low-cost RFID tag. Therefore, considering the advantages of simple and fast Hash function, research on RFID security authentication scheme based on Hash function has become a hot research field in recent years.
Because of the wide use of RFID technology, the fact that a single RFID tag integrates multiple applications has become a mainstream.This way can facilitate users to use the multi-application RFID tag and revoke some applications in the tag securely and efficiently. For example, in the campus, a card can be used for school shopping, dining, medical services, access control, and borrowing books from the library, etc. If a particular application is no longer used, the application will be revoked timely in the corresponding server. However, there are few researches on the revocable problem in the RFID secure authentication scheme and recently only revocable RFID security authentication protocol, called RSEL [10] , involves the issue. The main idea of RSEL protocol is that the value of validity periodof each tag is stored in the back-end data management system, then setting an appropriate value of validity period of tag and the corresponding list of tag identity, and only when the validity period of the tag ends, the tag application is considered to be revoked. But theschemeis only used in one-application RFID tag, and provides a certain degree of anonymity. Therefore, a strong anonymous, low-overhead, and revocable RFID secure authentication scheme which facilitates users to use the multi-application RFID tag and revokes some applications in the tag securely and efficientlyis much desired.
In this paper, we propose an RFID secure application revocation scheme. Technology implementation of the scheme is that adopting the hash function and a random number to generate the corresponding module through using a typical challenge-response mechanism. The proposed scheme which reduces storage overhead and provides a higher level of security ensures less tag computational complexity and communication complexity of the entire protocol.
Furthermore, this scheme which has wide development prospect cannot only be used in multi-application RFID tag but also be used in one-application RFID tag.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section , some related works are provided. In Section , the security achievements of the RFID secure application revocation schemeare provided. In Section , the RFID secure application revocation scheme is proposed. In Section , the performance analysis of the RFID secure application revocation scheme is evaluated in terms of security and complexity. Finally, concluding remarks are provided.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, RSEL authentication protocol will be discussed. Firstly, it is assumed that there aremany RFID system tags, each tag integrates m applications. RSEL protocol is divided into two sub-processes: the initialization process and the mutual authentication process. The entire protocol authentication process is also considered to be a tag legitimate identity authentication because of the RSEL protocol used in one-application RFID tag.
A. Initialization Process
In RSEL protocol, all entities will firstly complete the memory initialization. It is assumed that output length of hash operation is L. E: a status bit string of length L which is appointed by legitimate tag and server. When E equals str1, the application is only certified. When E equals str2, the application is revoked.
B. MutualAuthentication Process
The authentication process of RSEL protocol is shown in Figure 1 . 3) After the reader receives the information from the tag, it sends ‫ݎ‬ ଵ ‫ݎ,‬ ଶ ‫ܭ,‬ and ‫ܦܫ‪ሺ‬ܪ‬ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଵ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଶ ‫צ‬ ‫ܭ‬ ሻ to the sever.
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4) The sever searches whether
If any equation is equal and ‫ݎ‬ ଶ ܸ , the sever calculates Ԣሺ‫ܦܫ‬ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଵ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଶ ‫צ‬ ‫ܭ‬ ሻ using the corresponding ‫ܦܫ‬ and judge whether ‫ܦܫ‪Ԣሺ‬ܪ‬ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଵ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଶ ‫צ‬ ‫ܭ‬ ሻ equals ‫ܦܫ‪ሺ‬ܪ‬ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଵ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଶ ‫צ‬ ‫ܭ‬ ሻ. If these two values are equal, the authentication is successful, and the database considers that the tag is legal.
If ‫ܭ‬ cannot be found, sever considers that tag is not
, and ‫ݎ‬ ଶ ܸ , the sever ignores this message, and it considers that the tag is expired. Then the sever deletes the corresponding tag records to revoke the application in the tag.
is not equal to ‫ܦܫ‪ሺ‬ܪ‬ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଵ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଶ ‫צ‬ ‫ܭ‬ ሻ, the sever ignores this message, and it considers that the tag is not legal.
5) Sever calculates ‫ܦܫ‪ሺ‬ܪ‬ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଶ ሻ and sends it to the tag through the reader.
6) According to the ‫ܦܫ‬ stored and the ଶ generated, tag
calculates ‫ܦܫ‪Ԣሺ‬ܪ‬ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଶ ሻ and then compares the resulting value with the value received. When these two values are equal, the tag determines legitimate identity of sever and updates the value of ‫ܭ‬ according to the formula: ‫ܭ‬ ՚ ‫ܦܫ‪ሺ‬ܪ‬ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଵ ሻ .Otherwise, the tag ignores this message, and it considers that the process of authentication session fails.
III. THE SECURITY ACHIEVMENTS OF THE RFID SECURE
APPLICATION REVOCATION SCHEME
1) The scheme which ensures the truth of identity information of communicating parties uses mutual authentication way to achieve authentication between tag and server.
2) This scheme uses Hash function or private key separately to achieve hash or encryption processing of information transmission in the authentication process.
Even if attackers gain these data through eavesdropping or intercepting, they cannot get any useful information.
Therefore, the scheme improves the confidentiality.
3) Each response for the challenge between tag and reader is different, so attackers are not capable of successfully tracking a specific tag. Furthermore, even if attackers get the group index number and corresponding group, they cannot precisely find a specific tag. This scheme achieves the tag anonymity.
4) The attacker cannot obtain private information of legitimate tag and the current state flag information which is appointed secretly by legal tag and server.
Therefore, they cannot construct correct message authentication information to counterfeit a legitimate tag to achieve the server legitimate authentication. Similarly attackers cannot construct the value of correct message authentication information to counterfeit a legitimate server to achieve the tag legitimate authentication.
5) The fact that information exchange in the course of each session are function values of random numbers and these random numbers will independently generate guarantees that the interactive data has no direct relation with the previous data. Therefore, attackers cannot retransmit legal communication data to complete legitimate authentication in the previous session. This scheme improves the ability to effectively resist replay attack.
6) This scheme implements application revocation function through deleting the corresponding application records on the server-side. Even if attackers get some secret information about the application which is successfully revoked, they cannot also complete legal identity authentication of server which has no corresponding records. Therefore, this scheme can improve security on the basis of revocation.
IV. RFID SECURE APPLICATION REVOCATION SCHEME
In this section, we will propose the RFID secure application revocation scheme.
The authentication process of the RFID secure application revocation schemeis shown in Figure 2 
‫ܭ‬ ǡ ௗ is initialized to empty, ‫ܭ‬ ǡ ௪ is initialized to ‫ܦܫ‪ሺ‬ܪ‬ ‫ݎ۩‬ ǡ ሻ.
2) Reader initiates a session request to the i-th tag in the RFID network. The initialization process is that reader generates authentication request q, and the pseudo-random number generator generates first random number r 1 .This process initiates new session through sending r 1 and q to the i-th tag in the RFID network.
3) The i-th tag generates relevant certification information.
a) The pseudo-random number generator generates second random number r 2 after the i-th tag receives authentication request q.
b) According to the identity identifier ‫ܦܫ‬ , the private key‫ܭ‬ ǡ and the first random number r 1 of the tag, we can calculate the value of the first hash authentication information:‫ܯ‬ ଵ ൌ ‫ܦܫ‪ሺ‬ܪ‬ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଵ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଶ ሻ, and the value of the second hash authentication information: ‫ܯ‬ ଶ ൌ ‫ܭ‪ሺ‬ܪ‬ ǡ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଵ ‫צ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ଶ ሻ , ‫ܭ‬ ǡ is the private key value of the j-th application in the i-th tag.
c) The i-th tag generates the current value of the status flag information E, and calculates the value of XOR authentication information: ‫ܨ‬ ൌ ‫ܭ۩ܧ‬ ǡ , E is a status bit string which is appointed by legitimate tag and server, and its length is L. When E equals str1, the application is revoked. When E equals str2, the application is only 
A. Security Analysis
Comparison between the proposed RFID secure scheme and other existing authentication schemes based on Hash function in terms of security is shown in Table I . "¥" means satisfaction, "ൈ" means to dissatisfy, "-" indicates that the scheme does not relate to the problem. "#" indicates that the schemecan be used in one-application RFID tag, but they cannot be used in multi-application RFID tag. Although the ESLRAS protocol [11] proposed can resist most attacks in the literature, they cannot guarantee complete anonymity of tag. However, complete anonymity is one of the most significant prerequisites in the communication security.
RSEL protocol proposed firstly which is aapplication revocation scheme can be used in one-application RFID tag, but it cannot also achieve complete anonymity. The scheme proposed is an RFID secure application revocation scheme. It can achieve complete anonymity and facilitate users to use the multi-application RFID tag and revoke some applications in the tag securely and efficiently.
B. Complexity Analysis
In this section, we list the comparative analysis between the proposed scheme and the revocable RSEL protocol in terms of performance. It is assumed firstly that information length of each scheme is L. In light of the storage complexity, computational complexity and communication complexity, we analyze these two schemes.
1) Storage Complexity
First, it is assumed that RFID system only has a tag. To achieve application revocation in the RSEL protocol, the tag storage space requires 2L and the corresponding server storage space needs 4L. If the users achieve the secure revocation of m applications, the system will add another (m-1)
tags and establish the corresponding tag records on the server-side. Therefore, the tag storage space requires 2mL and the corresponding server storage space needs 4mL.
However, if we use secure application revocation scheme proposed, the scheme will make users use the multi-application RFID tag and revoke some applications in the tag. The tag storage space only requires (m+2)L and the corresponding server storage space needs (2m+2)L in the scheme proposed. Due to ݉ ʹ, the proposed scheme has less storage complexity, and it can greatly save storage space with the increase number of applications in the tag. Therefore, the proposed scheme can greatly reduce input costs.
2) Computational Complexity
To facilitate the comparison between RSEL protocol and the proposed scheme in terms of computing complexity, we use ܶ ு to be on behalf of a Hash function, ܶ ோ is on behalf of pseudo-random number or timestamp, ْ is on behalf of XOR operation. It is assumed that each group contains ‫‪ሺ‬‬ ͳሻ tags in the proposed secure scheme. Table II , computational complexity of the proposed scheme on the server-side has relation with the number of m application in each tag and the number of p tags in the group, then p and m can be set according to the actual application scenario of the scheme and the requirement for efficiency.
Compared with the RSEL protocol, in terms of computational complexity on the tag-side, the proposed scheme only adds a
Hash operation and a XOR operation to make users use the multi-application RFID tag and revoke some applications in the tag conveniently.
3) Communication Complexity
The proposed scheme mainly achieves application revocation and is used in multi-application RFID tag.
Therefore, to make users use the multi-application RFID tag and revoke some applications in the tag conveniently, the proposed scheme leads to communication complexity increase. From Table III , the proposed revocable secure authentication scheme do not increase the number of interactions, but the total traffic transmitted relatively increases a littlein the channel. To adapt to the new application scenarios, the proposed scheme needs to complete more interactive authentication information in the channel to lead to the total transmitted information increase. However, in the scenario, the scheme can bring great convenience to users, provide a higher level of security, and expand the application scale of the RFID systems.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A secure application revocation scheme in multi-application RFID tag is proposed in this paper. The scheme can achieve complete anonymity and facilitate users to use the multi-application RFID tag and revoke some applications securely and efficiently according to the users' actual requirements. Compared with other existing schemes, the proposed scheme provides a higher level of security and has an advantage of performance in terms of complexity.
Finally, the proposed scheme can be used in multi-application RFID tag to promote the development of the IoT in 5G.
